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Abstract.  computers have been looked as an instrument due to process and 
record information, but also as a means of automatically processing and 
transmitting information, and now as a means of autonomously thinking, 
deciding, acting. Recent trends in the field of what we are calling Artificial 
Intelligence, brought along new ways of expressing will and declarations – as 
an electronic behaviour that exteriorizes the content of a certain autonomous 
will. This leads us to a urgent need of rethinking many legal theories that we 
had since long ago already thought as definitely established, such as the 
theories of will, personality, consent and representation.  In this paper we will 
question legal relations involving Intelligent Electronic Agents.   
1.  Introduction  
Through the use of complex intelligent devices, capable of operating all alone and by 
themselves without any human intervention, “computer systems are now emerging 
that can operate not just automatically but autonomously”1. And the characteristics of 
the newest software agents are becoming so sophisticated, that we must already face 
the possibility of these expressing emotions, or manifesting certain features of true 
“personality”2. And the question is how far we may go in the consideration of 
computer intelligence and autonomy, in dealing with its acts3.  
Computers totally lack legal personality and legal capacity, that is to say the 
possibility of being subjects of rights and obligations, of expressing a valid and 
binding will, of being liable for their own actions. However, as intelligent artifacts 
they become capable to learn from experience, modify its own behaviour, according 
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to cognitive, reactive and pro-active processes quite similar to human acting4. And so, 
declarations of will and agreements “will therefore no longer be generated through 
machines but by them, without any intervention or supervision of an individual”5.    
Of course, this operates a radical shift in the way we understand legal relations. 
And some possibilities must be analyzed: the possibility of considering the electronic 
devices as mere machines or tools, the daring possibility of considering the electronic 
device as a legal person and also a third possibility, the application of the rules of 
agency to electronic transactions: “when a principal uses a computer in the same 
manner that it uses a human agent, then the law should treat the computer in the same 
manner that it treats the human agent”6. 
2. Computer Agent as a Machine or Tool  
One possibility would be to consider the whole declarative process as indeed 
performed by a human. It would be like establishing a legal presumption that -- Allen 
and Widdison call it a “legal fiction”!7 -- “all transactions entered into by the 
computer would be treated as transactions entered into by the human trader”, thus 
putting the intention and the whole risk for the transactions “on the person best able to 
control them – those who program and control the computer”. This “fiction”, based in 
a presumption that a person assents to a declaration or to a contract, even though he 
may not be aware that something was declared or that a contract was celebrated, 
would perfectly comply with the USA’s UCITA regime (and intention), as it was 
pointed out by Jean-François Lerouge: “if a party creates a situation in which an 
electronic agent is to act on his behalf, then a party is bound by the actions of the 
“agents”8. In this regard, Weitzenboeck speaks of attribution: “the operations of an 
intelligent agent are attributed to the human who uses the agent”9. That is to say that 
this theory recognizing that the only valid and relevant consent must be the one of the 
person on whose behalf the agent acts, a connection must thus be established between 
the action (non-human) and the intention (human), in a similar way to what appears to 
be a conclusive behaviour of the declarer in automatic inter-systemic electronic 
communications, such as EDI: “ by initiating the electronic agent, the user is deemed 
to have accepted that contracts concluded by the agent will be binding on such user. 
The assent of the electronic agent will be inferred to be the assent of the (human) user 
of the agent”10. The acceptance of this theory would have an obvious impact – the risk 
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of transactions would entirely be put “on the persons who program, control or 
otherwise use an electronic agent” and these would eventually be assigned a sort of 
liability regime similar to the one relating to the use of cars or machines by the owner. 
“A party may be liable for a damage caused by an object”11. It is a well known 
principle of Civil Law’s liability regime that “a person to whose sphere machines can 
be assigned to is supposed to be liable for them. Thus, the one shall bear the risk that 
has the right and ability to control the machine and receives a (financial) benefit from 
its use”12. 
But wouldn’t it be a terrible burden to put on programmers and users – who surely 
would not be “in such a condition to anticipate the contractual behaviour of the agent 
in all possible circumstances” and so would not be in position of “wanting” each and 
every “contract which the agent will conclude”?13.   
Although this theory of considering electronic agents as a mere machines or tools 
is the most well accepted by legal authors, and besides it was contemplated by the US 
and Canada legislation -- the truth is that some authors have been looking for other 
possible solutions. 
3. Electronic Agents as Legal Persons  
The attribution of legal personality to intelligent software agents14 would have at least 
two clear advantages: First, by the recognition of an autonomous consent – which is 
not a fiction at all -- it would solve the question of the validity of declarations and 
contracts enacted or concluded by electronic agents without affecting too much the 
legal theories about consent and declaration, contractual freedom, and conclusion of 
contracts15. Secondly, it would “reassure the owners-users of agents”, because, by 
considering the eventual “agents” liability, it could at least limit their own (human) 
responsibility for the “agents” behaviour16. This solution might look rather convenient 
in all aspects. But, nevertheless, its adoption will not be without difficulties. One of 
the difficulties relates to the identification of the agents? We would need technical 
answers to some questions. What constitutes the agent? The hardware? The software? 
Both? And “what if the hardware and software are dispersed over several sites and 
maintained by different individuals?”17. Besides that, agents may have the capability 
of dividing themselves “into the modules they include” or multiplying themselves 
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“into undistinguished copies”18. And if we consider mobile agents then we could 
speak of “ubiquitous agents” that can multiply themselves into undistinguished copies 
in order to distribute tasks among each other and to coordinate their own activities19. 
That would inevitably put a tremendous problem relating to the domicile of the 
electronic agent. In order to be a legal person, the agent must have a residence or 
domicile. But mobile agents “do not have an established physical location”20.   
Another relevant question would relate to “patrimonial duties”.  In order to exist, a 
legal person must have, or at least be capable of having a patrimony. But does it make 
any sense to attribute a patrimony to an electronic device? Can we imagine a situation 
of these electronic devices having “patrimonial rights and also be subject to liability 
for negligent acts or omissions, just as natural persons would”?21. Is it possible for us 
to state that an electronic device acted in good faith, in bad faith, with “knowledge or 
ignorance of certain circumstances”?22.  And how can electronic agents be sued in 
Court?    
Of course some of these difficulties are possible to overcome. But laws would have 
to be prepared and approved accordingly.  A non natural legal person surely must be 
object of a constitution / declaration act and eventually of registration23. Through 
registration procedure it could be attributed a physical location to the agent, and also a 
banking deposit, functioning as sort of an agent’s patrimony24 in order to ensure that it 
could fulfill its financial obligations and liabilities. As Giovanni Sartor refers25 “this 
fund would represent a warranty for the counterparties, who would need to know its 
amount before finalising a contract with the agent”.  A minimum amount of “capital” 
should be established, similarly to what happens to commercial corporations. Besides 
that, maybe the law should establish also a compulsory Insurance regime for 
Intelligent Agent’s activities. And of course, the electronic agent should be attributed 
a way of being represented in case of legal actions in Court or legal executive 
procedures. 
4. Agents and Representation 
It must be also considered the issue of the so-called “agency paradigm” and the 
possibility of its application to software agents. On this point, a first note must be 
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expressed. The word “agent”, commonly used in American doctrine, has not 
necessarily correspondence to the Civil Law concept of “Agence”26. In Portugal, a 
contract of agency is defined as “contract by which one of the parties (the agent) is 
obliged to promote on behalf of the other (the principal) the celebration of contracts in 
a certain area or with a determined circle of costumers, in an autonomous way and 
under retribution”. So, the agent acts on behalf of the principal but, normally, will not 
have representation powers, and will not even sign contracts - those will be directly 
signed by the principal)27. So, to avoid word confusion, we will rather speak of 
representation, exposing a brief summary of its possibilities in order see whether its 
application to “human-electronic agents” relation is possible or not.  
Several times, declarations with legal effects are not directly stated by those in 
whose legal sphere those effects are to be produced28. Someone acts in order to get 
legal effects produced in the legal sphere of someone else. Yet, under this broad 
concept of “representation” we can indeed imagine a whole lot of quite different 
situations.     
To begin with, we must state the difference between “direct representation” and 
“indirect representation”. In the latter, the indirect representative acts in the interest, 
but not in the name, of someone else, contrarily to what happens in direct 
representation29. As a consequence of this, in indirect representation the legal effects 
are produced in the legal sphere of the representative. So, in order to transfer any 
rights to the principal, there must be “a second act of transmission” of rights between 
the “representative” and the principal30. Actually, indirect representation, while 
commonly used for commercial purposes, is not really “representation”. For there to 
be representation it is required that the declaration is effected in the name of someone 
else31. However, in commercial transactions, the idea of electronic intelligent agents 
acting as “indirect representatives” could be exploited, provided that these could in 
some way be considered as “legal persons”. 
Different from representation is also the concept of the “messenger” or “nuntius”. 
This is the case of the declaration being effected by someone who acts as a mere 
instrument for a transmission, just operating mechanically a transmission of a 
previously disposed declaration of someone else32. Not having to reason or to decide 
anything, the “nuntius” does not have to have legal capacity at all, it is enough a 
“capacity to transmit the declaration of will of the dominus”33.  An interesting 
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question is whether a computer or electronic agent may be considered a “nuntius”. 
Within a functional analysis of the acting, it looks quite reasonable to consider that 
possibility.  
Direct representation can be based either in law – legal representation -- or in the 
agreement of the parties – voluntary representation34. In voluntary representation, at 
least in civil law countries, it is not absolutely necessary that the representative has 
full legal capacity, but it surely is required that he portrays the “natural capacity of 
understanding and wanting”35, because the representative actuates the will of the 
principal. Anyway, the representative must have “the capacity of understanding and 
wanting required by the nature of the transaction to be effected”36. But, as full legal 
capacity is not required, the representative may intervene – in the name of someone 
else -- in legal acts that probably would not be effective in case of him intervening in 
his own name37. Anyway, the representative must however have a minimum of 
capacity to understand the configuration and possible consequences of the act to be 
performed. As Anthony Bellia Jr. puts it “A person with limited capacity, such as a 
minor, may be an agent, but a person with no capacity whatever may not”38. Of 
course one might wonder whether an intelligent software agent might have that 
minimum of capacity to perform representative acts. No doubt that this kind of 
devices will probably have a much greater capacity to foresee all the consequences of 
its acting than any minor. Nevertheless, there is still a difficulty impeding the 
consideration of intelligent software agents as real representatives: they have no legal 
personality. Although most legal systems allow “an incapable person to act as an 
agent, such an agent is a person nonetheless”39  but that is not – for the moment – the 
situation of intelligent electronic devices.        
For representation to exist there must be some requisites: the declaration or acting 
must be effected in the name of someone else and the representative must declare his 
own will – and not just transmit a will expressed by someone else40 -- ; and 
furthermore the person acting as a representative must have powers of 
representation41 or authority. “An agent has actual authority to contract on behalf of a 
principal when the principal has manifested consent to the agent that the agent do 
so”42. If those requisites are fulfilled, the declaration or acting will produce effects in 
the legal sphere of the principal – this one will be legally bound by the declaration43.      
But if someone, acting as “representative” produces a declaration, in the name of 
someone else, but lacks the representation powers, the declaration will result 
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ineffective towards the principal44. Yet, there is always a possibility for the principal 
to ratify the declaration. Through ratification, the legal effects of the declaration are 
produced since the moment of the declaration itself45. Ratification becomes thus a sort 
of “supervenient legitimating” of the act of representation46.  
The consideration of a “representation without powers” and of ratification could 
lead us to some speculative inferences on the possibilities of having electronic agents 
as “not empowered” representatives, and so, of having the principal ratifying the 
declarations or contracts entered into by the electronic agent. The question is whether 
or not we might consider an intelligent electronic agent capable of representing 
someone in some act or contract, even without having the required powers – and the 
electronic device can not have powers of representation, not because of any lack of 
capacity for wanting and understanding47, but only because it is not yet considered as 
legal person. Emily Weitzenboeck48 refers to a “theory of ratification” under which, 
in case of an electronic agent entering into an – obviously unauthorized – transaction 
with some third party, it would then be possible “that the person who initiated the 
electronic agent might later affirm its operations by ratifying them”. This has been 
suggested as a way of encompassing the difficulties in considering the acts of 
electronic agents as legal acts. But the point is very doubtful. How should the legal 
system consider an act or declaration enacted by an electronic agent? Most probably it 
would qualify it as non-existent. And how could a non-existent act be ratified?     
In direct representation it must still be considered the possibility for the 
representative of delegating in someone else his powers, but only in case that it is 
allowed by the principal49, or that it might arise from the act of “procuration”50 – the 
act by which “someone attributes to someone else, voluntarily, representative 
powers”. But the representative may well look for help from other agents – it is 
allowed for the representative to look for cooperation partners to help him fulfill his 
representative duties51. 
All this could be very interesting when applied to electronic agents, having in mind 
the referred possibility of electronic agents cooperating among themselves or even 
multiplying or copying themselves in order to distributing or allocating tasks52. But 
this scenario also presents a great deal of difficulties, considering that this might 
precisely constitute one of the bigger difficulties in the identification of electronic 
agents and thus in their eventual personification. Anyway, if the agents could be 
considered as legal persons, it seems obvious that they would be empowered to look 
for the cooperation required for the fulfillment of its designed goals and finalities. But 
that would require legal personality for electronic agents. And, although it might look 
really exciting, the truth is that we are not yet there. 
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5   Conclusion 
Anyway, if the agents could be considered as legal persons, it seems obvious that they 
would be empowered to look for the cooperation required for the fulfillment of its 
designed goals and finalities. But that would require legal personality for electronic 
agents. And, although it might look really exciting, the truth is that we are not yet 
there. For the moment it is not possible to consider the “electronic agents” as legal 
persons. And yet, they exist and become more and more available for autonomous 
work in the electronic trading. Should we accept the fiction of considering them as 
mere tools the humans are using, even knowing humans may not be able to control 
them? Or is there another solution?  For the moment, and considering that European 
jurisdictions have not yet decided what regime to adopt concerning electronic agents, 
I would mention like to appoint the optimistic suggestion of Giovanni Sartor:  
“An easier and less risky way for the agent to make contracts… and to limit the 
liability of the user (at least, to some extent) is available. This consists in creating 
companies for on-line trading, which would use agents in doing their business. Such 
agents would act in the name of a company, their will would count as the will of the 
company, their legally relevant location would be the company’s domicile, and 
creditors could sue the company for obligations contracted by those agents. The 
counterparties of an agent could then be warranted by the capital of the company and 
by the legal remedies available towards defaulting commercial companies”53.      
Of course further possibilities may be exploited. For instance, to foresee a new 
legal approach of the contract itself, considering not the agreement of wills but the 
result of the acts of machines54 or devices predisposed by human or corporate bodies. 
Or even to consider informatics systems as instruments capable of creating new forms 
of life55,  maybe new germs of legal personhood, even a sort of limited personhood, as 
it happens with some legal “realities” not personified but, for instance, capable of 
some kind of “process legitimacy” to be in Court, to demand and to be sued, such as it 
happens with branches, agencies or other commercial establishments56 or even 
condominium 57.    
It is obvious that the existing legal norms are not fit for such an endeavouring 
challenge as the appearance of intelligent electronic agents in legal relations58. The 
debate is still beginning. New developments are arising in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence such as the “embodying” of electronic “conversational agents”59. Virtual 
persons will get more and more sophisticated, but also more identifiable. An ultimate 
choice must be made between the fiction of considering agents acts as deriving from 
human’s will and the endeavour of finding new ways of considering the electronic 
devices own will and responsibility. And maybe in the virtual world – as it happened 
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in the real world about corporate bodies – fictions will definitely be replaced by a 
more realistic approach of considering the challenging technical possibilities of 
software agents as new entities definitely requiring a particular legal approach in 
order to enhance the use of electronic commerce in a global world. 
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